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The Consequences of Issuing Convertible Bonds: 
Dilution and/or Financial Restructuring?1 
 
Abstract 
Historically, most convertible bond (CB) issues have been converted to equity sooner or later. 
The announcement of a CB issue will bring about a future dilution of the firm’s capital, and is 
often followed by a drop in share price. However, a CB issue by itself creates future value for 
the shareholders if it enables the firm to make profitable investments. It can also issue a 
positive signal regarding the restructuring of the firm’s financial liabilities and its attempts to 
optimise its financial structure. These positive effects, if they occur, will develop gradually 
after the issue, and cannot be identified by a simple short-term event analysis of a CB issue 
announcement. In this paper, we test the significance of the dilution effect, coupled with a 
possible value creation effect, using data from the French stock market. We introduce a 
comparison between dilutive convertibles and non-dilutive exchangeable bonds. By 
integrating different corrections and by selecting a window of analysis over a longer period 
after the announcement of the issue, we show that the negative cumulative average abnormal 
returns generally observed in previous studies become non-significant. This absence of global 
incidence is indicative of large differences in individual behaviour by issuers of CBs, and 
leads us to take into account the strategic choices linked to the issue of a CB. Two goals, often 
described as ‘investment financing’ or ‘financial restructuring’, may exist when issuing, and 
may appear to explain the size of the abnormal returns. 
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Introduction 
 
Since the end of the 1960s, convertible bonds (CBs) have had great success and, to this day, 
still represent a significant part of continental European stock exchange capitalization.2 
However, the issuing of CBs has often occurred in waves. At certain times, when the 
underlying share prices have risen, many CB issues have appeared. At other times, the market 
for CBs has been relatively inactive. Such was the case in 2001-2002 when the internet stock 
market bubble burst, bringing about a general stock market correction. Alternatively, rising 
stock prices or more favourable forecasts may bring about a renewed interest in CB issues. 
This happened in 2003-2004, with a significant surge of CB issues on the French and 
European stock exchanges. These regularities explain the timing of CB issues by taking profit 
from high stock prices. Therefore, CB issues would give a short-term signal of  stock price 
overvaluation. 
 
Share price will normally drop following the announcement of a CB issue because it signals 
the future dilution of the firm’s capital. The purpose of this paper is to go beyond the 
immediate consequences of the issue of CBs on the stock price, which have been extensively 
documented.  We investigate the motivation of the issuing firm and the timing of an issue. 
Historically, most CBs have been issued with the expectation of being converted to shares 
sooner or later. Because of their medium-term debt leverage ratio, CBs are considered 
deferred stocks. Investors, through the issuing firm, generally gamble on a future rise in the 
share price. A CB issue, by itself, creates future value for the shareholders if it enables the 
firm to make other profitable investments. It can also be a positive signal regarding the 
restructuring of a firm’s financial liabilities and the optimisation of its debt structure. 
                                                 
2
 In 2007, 41 French convertible bonds with a significant outstanding nominal value (above 15 million euros) were publicly 
listed on the Paris Euronext stock market. Their outstanding market value is worth 18 billion euros compared to a total stock 
capitalization of 1841 billion euros at the Paris Bourse (data from Exane on 05/07/07, www.exane.com). The French 
convertible bonds market is an order driven market with transactions cleared within the stock exchange. Only some 
international convertible bonds, mostly denominated in dollars, are traded on the OTC market.  
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We need to take into account the alternative economic rationales an investor might consider at 
the CB issue date. Three simple scenarios regarding a CB issue present themselves. In the 
first scenario, the CB issue is used only to reimburse an existing debt. In the case of a 
conversion, it will improve the debt ratio of the firm and keep its assets unchanged. Such a 
CB issue is then purely dilutive because the prospect of an increase in the firm’s value 
remains the same but is shared between more stocks. The probability of conversion is then 
lowered due to dilution. The decrease in debt leverage is important because the transfer of 
funds to equity, in the case of conversion, decreases the debt ratio3. Improvement of the 
financial structure creates some value for shareholders with a lower expected rate of return on 
equity, which may totally or partially balance the mechanical dilution effect.  
 
In the second scenario, the CB proceeds are invested and serve to enlarge the firm’s assets 
and expected economic profits. Dilution occurs immediately and appears more or less 
counterbalanced by profits in equity4, depending on the unknown profitability of the new 
investments. In medium-term view, the leverage ratio is lowered after conversion and thus 
creates value for all shareholders.  
 
Finally, in the third scenario, the leverage ratio remains unchanged as CBs are assimilated 
into capital equity and induce new debts. The amount invested is then increased by the 
leverage factor and, if investments are profitable, the dilution effect may be null and a net 
creation of value may follow the CB issue5. In the no dilution scenario, the expected 
economic return of new investments is the critical figure. Thus, a balancing mechanism may 
                                                 
3
 The effect is in fact doubled in a no investment scenario. For example, in a firm with 500 in equity capital and 500 in debt, a 
pure CB issue of 100, which is assumed to reimburse a current debt and is later converted, lowers the leverage ratio from 1 to 
0.67. The net worth of the firm is diluted by 20%.  
4
 In that scenario, using the example given in the previous footnote, the leverage ratio declines from 1 to 0.83 as far as the net 
worth of the firm after conversion is 600 and the debt remains at 500.  
5
 Taking the same example, in that scenario the firm maintains its leverage ratio at 1 and invests 200 in new assets through a 
CB issue of 100 and a new debt of 100. 
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occur between dilution on one hand, and financial decisions linked with a CB issue in terms 
of both investment and/or debt restructuring, on the other. Outside shareholders face a 
situation of asymmetric information in that they do not know which scenario exists. They can 
only guess at the existence of a dilution effect and speculate as to the investment/financing 
policy behind the CB issue. 
 
If CB effects are on the whole positive, and take place in a context of asymmetric information 
for the outside shareholders, they will only gradually become perceptible as the firm evolves. 
What will the firm do with the funds received? Will the leverage ratio be lowered? These 
questions cannot be answered by a simple short-term impact analysis of a CB issue 
announcement. Rather than analyse the event for only a few days immediately following it, it 
seems preferable to analyse the consequences over a longer period, for instance six months. 
This larger window allows the strict and immediate mechanical dilution impact of a CB issue 
to pass, and creates an opportunity to investigate the uncertain motivation of the company in 
issuing CBs: investment financing and/or financial restructuring. 
 
This article shows the importance of relevant correction mechanisms to go beyond the short-
term simple hypothesis of an immediate signaling effect. We test the significance of a dilution 
effect coupled with a possible value creation effect using data from the French stock market. 
A medium-term post-event window is used to analyse the future economic and financial 
choices of the firm. We propose corrections in the measurement of abnormal returns after 
issuance due to (i) a change in the leverage structure and (ii) the potential limits on dilution. 
Finally, we provide a comparison between dilutive convertibles and non-dilutive 
exchangeable bonds (EBs). We show that the negative cumulative average abnormal returns 
generally observed in previous studies are no longer statistically significant. This absence of 
global incidence is consistent with large differences in the individual behaviour of issuers of 
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CBs. By relating abnormal returns to a firm’s characteristics, we argue that the specific use of 
the capital raised is crucial in understanding the impact that the convertible-bond issuance has 
on stock prices. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 offers a synthesis of the literature covering the 
theoretical justifications of CB issues and the main empirical reactions of the underlying stock 
markets to this type of issue. Section 2 reviews the methodologies used and the results of an 
analysis of the French stock market reaction to CB and EB issues. A conclusion follows. 
 
1. CB Issues and Underlying Stock Market Reactions: Theoretical Justifications 
and Empirical Evidence 
 
1.1 The logic behind a CB issue 
For the firm’s management, as confirmed by Hoffmeister (1977) and Billingsley and Smith 
(1996), the main justification for a CB issue is to raise new equity capital. Nercy (1997) and 
Kenigswald (2003) also state that this motivation is stronger during an upward market; CBs 
issued during these periods benefit from higher price levels. During periods when the stock 
market is moving downwards, the desire to defer a CB issue is at odds with the desire to 
lighten the debt load. This latter desire has two aspects. The first is to increase debt at a lower 
cost compared to the current cost of a standard bond. The second, compatible with the first, is 
to improve the debt structure since analysts consider a CB issue to be a form of equity capital 
in their assessment of the firm’s financial structure. Bancel and Mittoo (2004) study financial 
officers to determine the reasons why European firms undertake a CB issue. A very large 
majority of chief financial officers (CFOs) – 86% – considered CBs to be a deferred issue of 
shares involving some dilution. At the same time, looking at the near future, 50% of these 
managers believed that a CB issue avoids short-term dilution for the shareholders, and only 
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23% thought that a CB issue improves the firm’s debt ratio. More recently, Dutordoir and 
Van de Gucht (2008) find that European convertibles are often used as sweetened debt, not as 
delayed equity. 
 
 
The financial literature identifies three major justifications for a CB issue: (i) reduction of 
agency costs, (ii) reduction of costs associated with asymmetric information, (iii) solving a 
problem of sequential financing. 
 
 (i) First, as soon as one questions the framework of Modigliani and Miller (1958, 
1963) (i.e., identical information and no conflict of interest) one must consider agency costs. 
Here, we should make a distinction between the agency costs generated by the conflict of 
interest between shareholders and creditors and those generated by the conflict of interest 
between shareholders and management. 
 
Following Galai and Masulis (1976), who emphasise the divergent interests of shareholders 
and creditors in the case of a variation of the firm’s risk, Green (1984) highlights the 
advantage of a CB issue over a standard loan. The conversion rights of CB holders enable 
them to become shareholders, if this is in their interest. Thus, a CB issue discourages 
excessive shareholder remuneration. In such a situation, CB holders may exercise their 
conversion rights, leading to the dilution of the amount distributed to the shareholders. In 
addition, CB holders are better protected against the effects of any attempt to increase the 
firm’s risk. The costs associated with the remuneration of a standard bond are higher in 
proportion to the importance of the market’s perception of the firm’s risk. Conversely, since a 
CB is equivalent to a debt combined with a share purchase option, if the market perceives an 
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increase in the firm’s risk, the reduction in the debt value is partially compensated by the 
increase in the value of the call option due to higher volatility. 
 
In the framework of asymmetric information, Jensen (1986) clearly shows the importance for 
shareholders of establishing a ‘costly’ surveillance procedure to ensure that management 
really acts in their interest. Thus, increasing debt allows the firm not only to reduce ‘free cash 
flow’, which might attract opportunist managers, but also forces the latter to be rigorous in 
assuming the loan’s repayments6. In this context, a CB issue again appears to be another way 
to reduce agency costs. The CB contributes to a reduction in the ‘free cash flow’ as a standard 
debt. It also requires management to increase the share value for a limited period, thus 
inciting conversion by the debt holders so as to avoid reimbursing them at the term of the 
issue. 
 
 (ii) Second, concerning asymmetric information, ‘signaling’ theory (as introduced by 
Ross (1977) or Leland and Pyle (1977)) is based on the idea that some choices made by 
management can be interpreted as a signal for the firm’s outside investors. For example, a 
higher level of debt can represent a signal of management confidence in the firm’s results and 
good health. In the context of asymmetric information between management and 
shareholders, Myers and Majluf (1984) develop a hierarchical theory of the firm’s financing 
choices (‘pecking order’): first are retained earnings, followed by the issue of standard debt, 
then risky debt, and lastly, the issue of equity capital. Management should follow this funding 
hierarchy so as to minimize the transfer of value during these issues from the older 
shareholders toward the new investors. The firm’s announcement of an equity issue would 
cause a negative market reaction, which is due to the perceived overvaluation of the stock on 
the market. A CB issue is considered deferred capital and is then associated with a negative 
                                                 
6
 The debt also results in agency costs brought on by the increase in the risk of bankruptcy, by taking into account the risk of 
asset substitution (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and even by the possibility of underinvestment (Myers, 1977). 
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signal of overvaluation. Negative announcement effects, as identified on the stock market at 
the issue date, have largely been interpreted as consistent with an overvaluation explanation. 
 
However, a CB issue can also result in the reduction of certain costs. Thus Stein (1992), in his 
‘backdoor equity’ theory, presents the CB issue as a technique to indirectly raise new capital 
when the asymmetry of information is such that a direct share issue is unfavourable and the 
costs of failure are high. The underlying idea is relatively simple; the lower interest rate for 
CBs relative to standard debt issue (due to the convertible option value associated with CBs) 
permits management (who anticipate a rise in the share price) to reduce the cost of debt and to 
subsequently raise new capital at a more attractive price. If asymmetric information exists 
about the firm’s risk level, particularly between management and investors, Brennan and 
Schwartz (1988) indicate that the divergence can be reduced by a CB issue. When an increase 
in the firm’s risk is anticipated by the market, CB holders should not require a higher 
remuneration of the debt. In fact, they will benefit from this eventual risk increase via the call 
option value incorporated into a CB. If the securities (CB and straight debt) are fairly priced, 
the issue of CBs would mitigate the risk shifting / asset substitution problem (Green, 1984), 
but would aggravate the effort moral hazard problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Innes 
(1990) underscores that straight debt, by imposing higher cash out-flows, is more efficient in 
disciplining managers and minimizing the agency problem. 
 
 (iii) Finally, Mayers (1998) considers the solution that a CB issue can offer to the 
problem of sequential financing. His analysis is similar to that of Schultz (1993), who justifies 
the consecutive issues of subscription warrants and new shares, or to that of Sahlman (1990), 
who outlines the opportunity for the ‘venture capitalist’ to subscribe to shares in a sequential 
manner. Mayers gives the example of an investment project A, which is ex ante profitable 
because of a growth option, or a future investment in a later project B, with profitability and 
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eventual realization that cannot be known until the end of project A. The problem consists of 
financing the two projects by minimizing the issue costs as well as those associated with an 
over-investment in a situation of a useless ‘free cash flow’. The conversion of a CB (with a 
maturity equal to that of project A) is interesting only if project B is realized. Such a CB issue 
is in fact superior to the strategy of issuing standard debt at the start of each project with 
maturity equal to the respective terms of the two projects, meaning two costly issues if the 
investment option is realized. 
 
If project B is not realized due to market conditions, the investment option associated with 
project A becomes valueless, and thus non-profitable. The price of the firm’s shares remains 
below the limit necessary for the CB conversion. At this point, the holders opt for 
reimbursement at face value, while being careful to avoid the risk of over-investment. If 
project B is realized, then project A becomes profitable due to the exercise of the investment 
option. The share price will then reach the limit for forcing the CB conversion, and the firm 
will keep the necessary cash to finance project B. In summary, by carefully choosing the 
conversion opportunity, the issue of a CB optimises the sequential financing of profitable 
investment options. 
 
1.2 Market reactions to the announcement of CB issues 
In the light of the above theoretical justifications for CB issues, we will now focus on the 
main findings of empirical studies testing the reactions of a number of stock markets 
(specifically, the United States, Japan, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom, and France) to the announcement of CB issues. Just as studies have measured the 
stock market effects of the dilutive/overvaluation signal of new share issues (for example, 
Asquith and Mullins, 1986) , many empirical studies have also been devoted to CB issues. In 
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fact, this hybrid form of financing often causes a negative reaction in the underlying share 
market, but one that is less significant than with a standard share issue. 
 
Thus, even though these empirical studies differ in time periods, choice of announcement 
date, size of the CB issue, chosen event methodology, window around the announcement date 
and placement techniques for each market, significant negative statistical reactions are 
observed in most studies. Most results are obtained from the calculation of abnormal short-
term returns using periods comprising only a few days, and most often immediately following 
the announcement date of a CB issue (cf. Table 1). 
 
INSERT Table 1 
 
In addition to the surprising and contradictory results from the Netherlands and Japan in Table 
1, the market’s negative reaction to CB issues appears more closely related to a reaction 
caused by share issues than one caused by standard bond issues. This underperformance 
generally remains significant when considering long-run analysis of stock returns following 
CB issues. These findings are also consistent with Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999) for the 
US; Kang, Kim and Stulz (1999), and Cheng, Visaltanachoti and Kesayan (2005) for Japan; 
and Abhyankar and Ho (2006) for the UK. Recently, Chang et al. (2007) examined a long-
term period after the issue of CBs in Taiwan. They showed an average negative abnormal 
return of between –16% to -26% over the three-year period following the event. When 
significant, underperformances (calculated on a yearly basis) range from –3% to -8% 7. Even 
if this tends to confirm the motivation of ‘raising deferred capital’ inherent in most CB issues, 
Abhyankar and Ho (2006) point out that the significance of the negative abnormal 
performance decreases or vanishes when using a conditional asset pricing model rather than a 
                                                 
7
 For a summary of main results in recent studies using data from the US and Japan, see Abhyankar and Ho (2006), p. 100, 
Table 1. 
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classical buy-and-hold abnormal performance return analysis. Thus, estimates of long-term 
abnormal returns seem to be very sensitive to the methodology selected to adjust for risk, and 
are not necessarily a stylised feature of the data. At the same time, frequent use of early 
reimbursement clauses (or call provisions) confirms the importance of ‘raising deferred 
capital’ for the firm’s management. In this context, Davidson, Glascock and Schwarz (1995) 
observe that the conversion prices used in the American convertibles market are generally not 
high and that the expected conversion period is short—less than 18 months. 
 
At first glance, this negative market reaction conforms to the hypothesis of asymmetry of 
information, as well as to the Myers and Majluf (1984) ‘pecking order theory’ and to the Stein 
(1992) theory of ‘backdoor equity’. However, several empirical studies offer more 
discriminating results using samples of any type of issue (stocks, CBs, etc.) or samples 
identifying only CBs. These studies include those carried out by Smith (1986), Kuhlman and 
Radcliffe (1992), Brennan and Her (1993), Davidson, Glascock and Schwarz (1995), Jung, 
Kim and Stulz (1996) and Lewis, Rogalski and Seward (1999) for the US market and by 
Burlacu (2000) and Ducassy (2003) for the French market. First, the market reactions to all 
issues (shares, CBs and standard debt) confirm, in particular, the ‘pecking order theory’. 
Second, specific reactions to CB issues are even more negative when the ‘conversion to 
shares’ component is strong in the market. Using a sample that differentiates standard CB 
issues from those of French OCEANE bonds, Ducassy (2003) observes that the French 
market’s negative reaction on the day of issue for OCEANEs (i.e., bonds that borrowers, 
when the conversion option is exercised, can either issue new shares or buy existing shares in 
the market) becomes positive after a few days8. This highlights the fact that the dilution effect 
appears to be stronger than the standard overvaluation explanation. 
 
                                                 
8
 Typically, an OCEANE contains an option on dilution. 
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The market’s negative reaction to a CB issue also conforms to the agency theory referenced 
by Green (1984), concerning the conflict between shareholders and bondholders. In fact, the 
dilution effect linked to the CB holders’ exercise of the conversion option can explain this 
reaction. By contrast, it is much more difficult to justify the negative market reaction to a CB 
issue using the logic of sequential financing or the reduction of agency costs generated by the 
conflict of interest between management and shareholders. However, evidence that the 
negative reaction to CB issues is generally lower than the negative reaction to the issue of 
shares can also be seen as shareholders having a positive perception of the disciplinary effect 
of the debt component of CBs (Jensen, 1986). 
 
In parallel with the generally negative market reaction to CB issues, we can also mention 
other empirical studies attributing the market reaction according to various specific variables. 
Following the work initiated by Eckbo (1986) or Mehta and Kahn (1995) in the US market, 
Ducassy (2003) points out that the French market reaction depends on the use of funds 
received from the CB issue. This reaction is very negative when future investments are 
announced, but it becomes non-significant when it is a matter of financial restructuring 
(lowering the debt ratio). This suggests that the use of CBs to raise capital equity is a 
favourable signal for the market (i.e., management expects a quick conversion following a 
forecasted rise in the share value). 
 
The firm’s size does not appear to be a significant factor in the market’s reaction to a CB 
issue (see, in particular, Lewis, Rogalski and Seward (1999) for the US market; Abhyankar 
and Dunning (1999) for the UK market and Ducassy (2003) for the French market). The 
firm’s risk, whether it is measured by the beta (Mehta and Kahn, 1995) or by the volatility of 
return (Lewis et al., 1999), results in market reactions that are magnified for the US market 
and unchanged for the French market (Ducassy, 2003). Just as Lewis et al. (1999) observe in 
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the US market, Ducassy (2003) finds that a high level of debt in the year preceding the issue 
has a positive effect on the size of the French market’s reaction. This result fits the theoretical 
contribution of Stein (1992), which shows that an indebted firm has interest in a CB issue 
only if its management is optimistic about the evolution of its share value, and the subsequent 
reduction in debt after conversion. Finally, Ducassy (2003) validates the model proposed by 
Lucas and McDonald (1990), who state that the market reaction to an issue is more 
unfavourable when the prior rise in the share price is significant. She observes that CBs issued 
during a rising market elicit more severe negative reactions in the French market. In such a 
context, investors are more sensitive to a fear of overvaluation of stocks. 
 
2. The French Market Reaction to the Issue of Convertible and Exchangeable Bonds 
 
Our empirical study intends to focus more on the motivations and the consequences of 
convertible and exchangeable bond issues than previous studies. In particular, its aim is to 
analyse the French stock market reaction to the issue of these types of financial instruments. 
Previous studies have typically focused on events in the short term, before and after the issue, 
and have often identified abnormally negative results. However, by taking into account 
possible corrections within a larger window of investigation around the issue date, we can 
expect to capture the presence of multiple effects, sometimes positive but often negative 
(dilution, overvaluation signaling, etc.), that are not foreseen at the time of the issue. It is 
therefore important to determine which effects prevails. This last point also leads to 
implications concerning portfolio management. 
 
2.1 Sample and methodology 
A sample of 59 CBs issued on the French market between 1996 and 2003 is studied. They are 
selected from Exane’s convertible database, each with a minimum outstanding nominal value 
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of 100 million euros to avoid liquidity problems. Two sub-samples were created by separating 
CBs from exchangeable bonds (EBs). The first are bonds that allow conversion into shares of 
the issuing firm itself according to a contractual conversion ratio. The 43 CB issues entail a 
potential effect of capital dilution. In order better to analyse dilution, 16 exchangeable bonds 
(EBs) were considered. These are bonds a firm issues that can be converted into shares of 
another firm. The latter are usually linked to the former, either within a group (parent firm, 
associated firm, affiliate, etc.), or outside the group9. Under such circumstances, the issue is 
‘backed’ by the existence of a controlling block of shares. Furthermore, there is no dilution 
effect because there is no issue of new shares. Although there are only a few of them in the 
sample, EB issues can be used as a benchmark to test the importance of the dilution effect for 
CB issues. 
 
The characteristics of the sample are shown in Table 2. The average outstanding value is high, 
amounting to 739 million euros. Also shown are the characteristics of the firms from which 
stocks can be obtained (i.e., the issuing firms for CBs and the ‘target’ firms for EBs). These 
show comparatively high book leverage ratios (on average, 1.57). However, the debt leverage 
calculated on the market equity value at issue has, on average, a more standard value of 0.82. 
The issue of CBs/EBs results in a potential strengthening of the equity capital and, therefore, 
involves a subsequent reduction in the debt leverage where there is a total and immediate 
conversion into shares. In this case, the book debt ratio decreases by -0.49 and the market 
value-based debt ratio decreases by -0.1010. 
 
Insert Table 2 
 
                                                 
9
 For example: with a view toward reducing blocks of participation, particularly in Germany. 
10
 The largest reduction in book ratios is due to the fact that a CB issue is based on the market value of shares at the moment 
of issue plus a premium. Since the price of shares is higher than their balance sheet value, the firm’s accounting net worth is 
thus re-valued after the issue. 
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Our sample shows that in an EB issue, a controlling investor will place an average stake of 
5% of the target firm’s equity on the market. For CBs, the mechanical dilution following the 
issue and the creation of new shares represents an average of 10% of the capital, resulting in 
an average dilution ratio of 0.91. 
 
The daily share values, as posted by Bloomberg, were recorded around the announcement 
date of the CB issue11. Eliminating holidays, we took the closing prices of the 164 days 
(approximately seven calendar months) preceding the CB issue. We then followed the share 
prices for six months after the issue. We considered a total period [d-163, d+122] (d being 
announcement date of the issue) for the stock returns. 
 
We used an estimation window L1 of 146 daily returns for the market model (i.e., d-163 to d-
18, approximately six and a half months). The daily returns were calculated as the differences 
in the price logarithms. To avoid the problem of the variability of beta coefficients in the 
market model over a longer period (Simon, 1986), we selected a relatively short estimation 
window L1. Estimation periods of different lengths from the L1 window of 146 days were 
also tested: a longer period of 219 days (10 months) and a shorter period of 73 days (three 
months). Periods that are too long can yield out-of-line beta parameters because the firm’s 
strategy and risk can change over time. Windows before the event that are too small can lead 
to an insufficient number of observations and low quality estimates. The problem of the 
stability of beta estimates is addressed by analysing the cumulative average abnormal returns 
obtained through the three different estimation windows. Although we favoured the L1 
window of 146 days, all three windows yielded similar findings; the results from the longer 
and the shorter windows are also presented below. 
 
                                                 
11
 We checked the sample of issues to verify that prices were not affected by parasite information published during the period 
of investigation around the issue date. 
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By choosing a six-and-a-half month period to estimate the beta coefficients, this study differs 
from previous ones, which have generally focused on shorter periods and had a lower number 
of estimate points. It was deemed preferable to interrupt the window of estimate 17 days 
before the official announcement of the issue, so as to counterbalance a minimum period of 
three weeks before the opening of the issue. Organizing a large issue of CBs is a somewhat 
long and complex task. There is a risk that, in the final days before the issue becomes public, 
the financial press or analysts will learn of it. We estimate the market model parameters as: 
 
 18,...,163ˆˆ −−=∀++= ddtRR itMtiiit εβα      (1) 
 
The CAC 40 market index12 is used, and the market model estimates for period L1 are then 
used to generate the abnormal daily returns over test period L2. The six and half months  test 
period L2 is similar to the length of L1, and enables us to measure the consequences over a 
longer horizon. The aim is to integrate the possible anticipation and appreciation by the 
market regarding changes in the firm’s behaviour. For example, we took into account the 
forecast of new investments that may result from the use of the funds raised by the CB issue. 
Shorter-term windows consisting of the few days following the issue cannot take into account 
a firm’s future financing or investment decisions. A medium-term abnormal performance 
analysis is performed and includes the two-week period prior to the formal public 
announcement of the issue to the market. These two weeks would take into account the 
possible dissemination of information to financial intermediaries and banks involved in the 
issuing syndicate. 
 
                                                 
12
 Most firms in the sample were or are still part of the CAC 40. In general, they are large firms. Thus, our use of the CAC 40 
index seems justified, and is confirmed in further tests when the CAC 250 index was used. 
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Long-term analysis of abnormal performances was questioned by Fama (1998) because using 
extrapolated values to estimate expected returns leads to a poor description of the patterns of 
average returns. Risk premiums can change and statistical inferences can be biased over a 
long-term horizon of three to five years after the event. This problem can be handled either by 
using a long-term comparison with a paired sample of similar stocks and calculating buy-and-
hold abnormal returns, or by using an asset-pricing model to estimate expected returns. Long-
term horizons were specifically developed to analyse the consequences of seasoned equity 
offerings (SEOs). They have previously been used, for example, on US data by Eckbo et al. 
(2000) and Jegadeesh (2000), and on UK data by Levis (1995) and Ho (2004). Long-term 
horizons are also necessary to see the consequences of mergers or acquisitions on 
performance. Agrawal et al. (1992) considered a time horizon of five years after the public 
offering. Gregory (1997) analysed a period of two years using UK market data, and Pecherot-
Petit (2005) considered a period of three years on French data. 
 
An alternative method for assessing abnormal returns over a long-term period after an event is 
the calendar time portfolio regressions (CTPRs) analysis proposed by Mitchell and Stafford 
(2000). It follows the average monthly return of a portfolio of underlying stocks of firms 
issuing EBs or CBs over a post-event period of 1 to 3 years. The average abnormal return 
during the post-event period is the intercept of the time series calendar portfolio regressed on 
the Fama and French three-factor model. This methodology is often used to analyse long-term 
benefits following from acquisitions. Essentially, long-term post-event studies assume that the 
stock prices are not contaminated by further evolution. Financing decisions, such as the issue 
of CBs, generally occur in a stream of many financial and economic choices. This leads to 
privilege medium-term post-event periods. Our medium-term horizon of six months goes far 
beyond the ‘long-term’ horizons typically identified in the literature. It allows us to check 
whether post-event stock prices remain unpolluted by other major financial or economic 
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decisions. In particular, it allows for the possibility that the standard deviation of residuals 
from the estimated market model window might remain the same over the subsequent L2 
window. Using a 140-day period from d-17 to d+122, we calculated the abnormal returns in 
the usual manner: 
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We calculate the cumulative average abnormal returns (CARs) beginning with the lower 
bound of L2 set at d-17, t1: 
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The variance of cumulative returns can be written as13: 
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where σI is an estimate of the standard deviation of stock returns i, which results from market 
model (1) on the L1 period. 
 
                                                 
13
 Estimate (4) is only valid if L1 is large enough. Then the sampling error effect of the parameters disappears. Here we have 
a medium-term window of 146 observations.  
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To test the hypothesis of null cumulated abnormal returns, we calculated the following 
statistic, which asymptotically follows a normal distribution: 
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For smaller samples, the previous statistic is a t-Student with N-1 degrees of freedom. The 
estimation of abnormal returns based on the market model is exposed to possible errors of 
estimation resulting due to use of an incorrect model14. We also crossed the previous 
parametric tests with a non-parametric statistic, as suggested by Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay 
(1997)15; this complementary specification allows us to check the problem of specification of 
the normal returns model. The following variable was calculated at each day of the L2 period: 
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where N+ represents the number of cases of positive abnormal returns in the post-event 
period. 
 
This statistic tests the hypothesis that the percentage of positive cumulated abnormal returns 
is 0.50 (assuming independent abnormal returns across stocks). A rejection of the null 
hypothesis shows that the issue had a positive impact on the abnormal returns. The sign test 
statistic is asymptotically normally distributed. The assumption that the abnormal returns are 
distributed normally is important because the sign test is not adapted to an asymmetrical 
                                                 
14
  We also used a constant mean-return model to get abnormal returns over the L2 window. That model simply states that the 
returns are constant, so equation (1) becomes: itiitR εµ += . The abnormal returns over the L2 window are estimated 
using iµˆ . The CAR tests are the same as the previous ones. Brown et al. (1985) highlight the fact that the results from the 
constant mean model are often similar to those arising from more sophisticated ones (see Campbell et al., 1997, p.154). 
15
 See reference, p. 160-172.  
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distribution of data. We checked the skewness and the kurtosis of the individual abnormal 
returns and verified whether the series of abnormal returns over the L2 window followed a 
normal distribution. The Bera-Jarque test confirmed that the distribution of abnormal returns 
did not differ from normality. 
 
Finally, we tested the assumption that there was no clustering. The aggregation of variance 
above stocks using equation (4) assumes that there is no cross correlation between the 
abnormal returns of individual stocks. Such a situation can occur when the event windows of 
individual securities overlap. We calculated the number of overlapping pairs of abnormal 
returns series. For the EB sample (16 stocks), there were 17 pairs of partially overlapping 
abnormal returns out of a total of 120 pairs (14.6%). Looking at the CB sample (43 stocks), 
we found 117 pairs of partially overlapping pairs out of 903 total pairs of stocks (13.9%). 
Assuming the overlapping pairs overlap halfway through the L2 period, we have an average 
of only 7% of individual ARs showing overlap with another AR. The conclusion that can be 
drawn is that our data were not heavily exposed to a clustering problem16. 
 
2.2 Results 
The cumulative average abnormal returns of shares for each type of bond (convertible and 
exchangeable) are presented respectively in Figure 1 and in Figure 2. 
 
Insert Figure 1 
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 The assumption that the distribution of abnormal returns has the same characteristics before and after the event is also 
important. Without any theoretical explanation, we do not see why an issue of convertible bonds could induce a larger or a 
smaller variance. A priori, there are as many reasons for the variance to increase as there are for it to decrease. If a CB issue 
strengthens the financial structure of the firm, the risk to the economic cash flow can be lower. If the CB issue helps to 
launch new risky investments through debt financing, the future variance may increase. The event does not yield in itself a 
‘one way’ induced increase in the variance. On a large sample of stocks, the two phenomena may cancel each other out to 
some degree. However, the limited size of our EB sample exposes these data to a risk of induced variance. 
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The cumulative average abnormal returns are clearly negative. The stocks related to EBs show 
a 17.1% underperformance over the six-month post-event period. The CBs show a similar 
profile and result in a 9.7% abnormal negative return17. Before the issue date, there is only a 
limited drop of -1.5% to -2.3% between d-6 and d-318. Looking at the parametric t statistics, 
this abnormal drop is not significantly negative for this very short window. This is explained by 
the large dispersion of individual CARs; more than one-third of them show evidence of 
positive abnormal returns around the issue date. However, the sign test shows a significant 
negative market reaction between d-6 and d-4 (i.e. before the CB issue, see Annex 2). This can 
probably be explained by the fact that the information about the issue is known in the market 
before the public announcement. Financial analysts know that the firm plans an issue and 
financial officers disseminate the information. The banks responsible for launching the issue 
contact partners to set up a syndicate. The delay in the issue and handling of the operation 
allows for information to circulate and for the market to adapt. The negative effects, possibly 
linked with dilution or overvaluation signals, are taken into account as soon as the market 
becomes aware of this information. 
 
The date of the official announcement comes only at the end of this process. The initial drop in 
return is of short duration (since the abnormal returns become positive for EBs) and increases 
from a relative minimum of -2.3% at [d-6] to -1% for CBs in the 10 days following the issue. 
Examining the short-term window, we find no evidence of abnormal returns for EBs, rejecting 
the overvaluation hypothesis because, by definition, dilution cannot be observed with these 
issues. As a whole, dilution or overvaluation reaction following (or identified before) the 
                                                 
17
 We also calculated the abnormal returns according to normal returns based on a weekly estimated market model. This one 
was estimated five times, starting on different days of the week (i.e., Monday, Tuesday, etc.). We obtained five estimates of 
weekly betas for each stock. The weekly-based CARs were then calculated for all stocks. At day d+122, the five ‘weekly’ 
CARs were, respectively, -9.7%, -8.8%, -22.3%, -3.4% and -9.9%, giving an average value of -10.8%. These data are very 
similar to the CAR of -9.7%, resulting from a daily estimate of the betas in the market model. The daily estimates of betas 
will be favoured hereafter because of the higher number of observations (145 versus 29 for weekly betas). 
18
 This remark does not reflect precisely the results of most of the empirical studies mentioned. These identify a significant 
drop immediately at or after the issue and not before. 
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announcement of an issue is rejected. Comparing abnormal returns of CBs to those of EBs 
outlines the importance of the dilution effect as being immediately perceived by the market. 
Abnormal returns are close to zero at the issue date of EBs, but are fairly negative for CBs, 
with an average value of -1.8%. The major difference between the two samples is due to a 
dilution effect, which is perceived negatively by the market. Therefore, the signaling 
overvaluation hypothesis is not confirmed by the analysis of the short-term reaction of the 
market. The -1% abnormal return seen in the 10 days after the issue is in line with previous 
studies considering French market data. Looking ahead, both EBs and CBs become 
increasingly negative within the first 20 days (or one calendar month) following the issue and 
stand then at around a -1.6% CAR. 
 
2.2.1. Analysis of exchangeable bonds (EBs) 
The overall drop in EB returns is important, which means that this type of operation, even 
though not exposed to dilution, will probably result in reduced value to investors. Most of this 
can be explained by the fact that contractual conversion ratios are fixed at a high level by the 
controlling shareholders who can then sell their shares at a good price. The average EB 
conversion premium at issue is 26.1%19. The diffusion of capital resulting from the potential 
placement of a block of shares on the market does not appear important enough for the 
dominant shareholder to lose control. The average diffusion rate of capital linked to 16 EB 
issues was found to be only 5% of the equity capital. We can hypothesize that EBs issues 
develop in a logic of adjustment of ownership by the majority shareholder, who cashes in part 
of his ownership by selling it at a price considerably higher than the market price. The 
abnormal six-month return closely equals the conversion premium at issue. 
 
                                                 
19
 Two EBs that had a negative bonus at issue were excluded from the calculation of this average.  
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However, we note that the cumulative average abnormal return remains non-significant prior to 
reaching the 68-day mark after the issue, when it reaches an average of -9%. This can be 
explained by the existence of large variations in the evolution of abnormal returns. Of the 16 
stocks, we notice two issues for which the abnormal returns are positive (Rallye exchangeable 
with Casino and Agache with LVMH). These two issues do not prevent the average of 
abnormal returns from becoming significantly negative after three months. Concurrently, the 
sign test shows a significant cumulative negative return (at the 5% level) from the 37th day after 
the EB issue and from the 45th day (at the 99% level). The values of the cumulative average 
abnormal returns and the CAR test are presented in Annex 1. The values of the sign test over 
the L2 period are shown in Annex 2. 
 
2.2.2 Analysis of convertible bonds  
The raw results obtained above must be placed in context; the cumulative average negative 
abnormal returns of 9.7% over the six-month period are only superficially impressive (see 
Annex 1). They become statistically significant at the 10% level only after the 110th day after 
issue (at 5% after 118 days, and never at the 1% level). The sign test remains non-significant 
(see Annex 2). The calculation used to determine the excess returns has a weakness since it is 
based on beta coefficients for the normal stock returns calculated before the issue for firms 
with a given financial structure. The CB issue results in a reduction in the firm’s debt leverage 
if and when the conversion takes place. Therefore, both the beta coefficient and the expected 
normal return would drop following the CB issue. The cumulative average abnormal returns 
shown in Figure 1 are therefore systematically biased in favour of accepting the hypothesis of 
an abnormal return. This problem does not exist for EBs; the firm’s debt structure remains 
unchanged after the issue. 
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If we consider a CB issue as pure debt, no conversion, and conversely no dilution, should be 
taken into account. This very short-term approach is too simplistic; we must analyse CBs as a 
medium/long-term choice of financing policy. In case of a very strong likelihood of 
conversion, a dilution effect is also anticipated by investors, who will be faced with a larger 
number of shares. All other things being equal, the dilution causes a loss in share value for the 
firms issuing CBs. This dilution must, for rational investors, result in a normal return now 
based on the number of new shares compared to the number outstanding. Investors would take 
into consideration the firm’s investment prospects. A CB issue will change the debt structure of 
the firm, but it can be used to finance new investment. Thus the dilution effect is not linked 
solely to mechanical change in the debt leverage, but must be mixed with the profitability 
prospects of the firm. 
 
Therefore, we introduce two corrections with the goal not of defining not a strict estimate of 
abnormal returns, but rather a band inside which the abnormal returns may lie. The abnormal 
returns following a CB issue are limited first by the polar behaviour of the firm, which may 
behave differently in terms of restructuring/investing the raised fund and secondly, by the 
effective impact of the dilution effect. The two corrections soften the global negative abnormal 
return documented by traditional event study methodology and introduce lower and upper 
bounds on CARs. From a methodological point of view, the correction of systematic risk 
measures does not seem very common in the literature, with the noticeable exception of 
Janjigian (1987) or Kleidt and Schiereck (2006)20. 
 
- Correction for debt leverage 
The first correction takes into account the mechanical effect of a CB issue, which is to 
reinforce the financial structure by increasing the firm’s net equity due to future conversion. 
                                                 
20
 These authors document a systematic (positive) change in systematic risk after the issue date. They refer explicitly to 
variation in debt-asset ratios and mention the impossibility of detecting these moves ex ante.  
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Here, at the issue date, we consider a CB issue as net equity. The accounting debt leverage ratio 
(calculated from the equity accounting value) moves, on average, from 1.57 to 1.08 after the 
issue under the double hypothesis of a total and immediate conversion (for 34 firms issuing a 
CB). The debt leverage ratio calculated from the market value of equity moves from 0.82 to 
0.72 (under the same double hypothesis). The investors consider conversion from an ex ante 
point of view and calculate the correction based on the characteristics of the issue and of the 
firm at the issue date. Looking at the CB sample, 96.7% of the matured issues have been fully 
converted. Only one issue, representing 2.8% of the total amount, was repurchased. The 14 CB 
issues of our sample still alive in December 2006 exhibit an average conversion rate of only 
12% (weighted by individual CB amount). Among them, 9 out of 14 still have an outstanding 
amount identical to the nominal issued amount, which means that no conversion occurred from 
the bondholders. Looking at the outstanding issues in December 2006, recent issues are still out 
of the money and not converted, but the majority of those close to maturity have low (or 
negative) premiums. These ex post figures confirm the fact that CBs, on average, can be 
considered as almost entirely converted at maturity. Assuming that an average proportion of 
96.7% of any issue is converted at maturity, and considering an average time to maturity of 6 
years at the issue (see Table 2), we can estimate an ex ante discounting equity conversion 
factor applied to all CB issues. The actual proportional conversion factor is an average of 
72.3% of the initial amount at the issue date21. This weighted amount should be added to the 
net equity of the firm to obtain its ex ante proxy of the new leverage ratio. The ex ante 
conversion probability is the only information available to investors, but it is very difficult to 
estimate case-by-case before and during the subscription periods just after the CB issue 
announcements. Moreover, this ex ante probability assessed by a standard CB pricing model 
evolves over time with option parameters. Even if we could estimate the underlying process of 
the asset at the issue date, this process can change through the investments made by the firm 
                                                 
21
 This figure comes from an average conversion frequency of 97% and a discount factor of 0.746, assuming an interest rate 
of 5% over the average 6-year duration of maturity converted CBs. 
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and the use of funds raised by the CB. Using the ex ante individual probability of conversion 
may therefore be misleading. The use of ex post data for determining the leverage adjustment 
should be considered as a convenient hypothesis of perfectly rational investors’ expectations 
regarding conversion rates. The debt leverage ratio after the issue is obtained by adding the ex 
ante average discounted value of the CB to equity. This results in a correction in the value of 
the firm’s beta by taking into account the consequences of its new debt structure. This 
correction results in a new value for the beta coefficient of the market model, which is lower 
due to the strengthening of the equity capital. The adjustment coefficient is therefore 
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1ββ         (7) 
where lbefore is the debt leverage before issue and lafter is the debt leverage after issue. 
 
We focus here on the effect of the CB issue on the beta of the underlying stock and not on its 
effect on the debt beta. Other studies looking at CB portfolios consider particularities of CB 
betas that are (i) variable, and (ii) asymmetric due to optional characteristics. Frankle and 
Hawkins (1975) and Ammann, Kind and Seiz (2007) suggest the use of time-varying betas for 
CBs in order to correct these two features (see also Ang and Chen (2005), Ferson and Schadt 
(1996) and Adcock et al. (2007), for the use of time-varying betas in asset pricing and 
performance measurement of stock portfolios). Here, we do not assume that CB betas are 
constant. However, focusing on stock betas, we assume that these may be estimated regardless 
of the debt and CB betas of the firm. This assumption relies on checking that the corporate debt 
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beta of some of the firms in the sample is effectively negligible22. It is clear that our first order 
correction of equity beta provides only a mechanical adjustment. This is specifically due to the 
change in the leverage ratio considering CBs as deferred stocks and taking into account the 
effective conversion rate. This mechanical adjustment can be considered a suitable alternative 
in a comparative ‘event studies’ framework related to the existing literature that provides 
simple short-term impact analysis of a CB issue announcement. On average, the adjustment 
coefficient applied to beta values is 0.916 (using book debt leverage) and 0.964 (market based 
leverage). The market model is then used to give expected returns based on the new (book) 
debt leverage ratios. Lowering the beta risk premium, our correction results in a reduction in 
the expected normal returns, and thus leads to a lower negative abnormal profitability. 
 
We obtain a cumulative negative profitability of 8.2% over the six months period following 
the  CB issues. The gap between CBs and EBs widens (see Figure 2). The average cumulative 
return of CBs becomes significantly negative the 121st day after the issue (at the level of 10%; 
see Annex 1). This result is not robust because the return turns non-significant the next day. 
The non-parametric sign test, which aims to show cumulative negative abnormal returns, 
never satisfies the usual acceptance levels. This means that the average of returns hides a very 
strong dispersion of individual abnormal returns. At the end of the period, we found that 20 
out of 34 shares had a negative cumulative return and 14 shares had a positive cumulative 
return. This means that after the debt leverage correction, one in three firms shows a 
significant positive cumulated abnormal return. On average, there is nothing to allow the 
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 In fact, the value of the beta coefficient after an issue should take into account the beta of the firm’s debt. We then 
have: eDS
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= , where βa is beta of assets, βD is beta of debt, βe is beta of stocks, D is market value of 
debt and S is market value of equity. For a given economic beta of assets, the correction for the stock beta is equal to that of 
equation (7) only if the debt beta is zero. We validated this hypothesis by analysing for CB issues the parallel evolution of the 
returns of standard fixed income bonds of the same issuing firm within the same window as in L1. Only eight firms 
comprised this sample. The test of the market model applied to these eight bonds does not yield definitive results. In three 
cases the bond beta is significantly negative, in two cases it is significantly positive and in four cases, it is not significantly 
different from zero. The average value of the estimated bond betas is 0.032 and is statistically negligible. Under these 
conditions, we are led to the hypothesis of null bond betas, a hypothesis that was confirmed by a regression of the JP Morgan 
euro bonds index on the French stock index. The estimated value of the beta coefficient of the bond index was 0.0145 for the 
period 1995-2003. Thus, we consider the effect of bond betas to be negligible. 
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assertion of the existence of a negative cumulative abnormal return after a CB issue. Around 
the issue, the immediate negative market reaction that appears on day d-6 is non-significant 
and rapidly disappears. The drop in the required return linked to a lower beta diminishes the 
temporary drop of return only right when the issue is announced. Over the period [d-17, d+0] 
before the issue, the average cumulative return does not differ significantly from zero, with an 
average value of -0.8% as against -1.8% previously without correction (see Annex 1). It 
becomes null 7 days after the issue. 
 
Depending on the CB issue, motivations of the issuing firm and stock market conditions, 
individual stock-like convertibles will obtain lower financial leverage and lower equity beta, 
while debt-like convertibles may increase financial leverage and increase equity beta. Our 
previous result is robust to the way the correction for subsequent leverage ratios of the firm is 
made. We considered the two extreme eventualities, as viewed from the issue date: (i) a total 
and immediate CB conversion, resulting in a drop in the leverage ratio; and (ii) a no 
conversion hypothesis, resulting in an increase in the leverage ratio due to the debt status of 
the CB. The correction factors of the beta are, on average, 0.896 (lower leverage due to 
conversion) and 1.179 (higher debt leverage). When correcting the individual values of the 
beta assuming these two eventualities, we get respective values of CAR of -4.4% and -8.4% at 
d+122. The CAR calculated using the average ex ante discounting factor (+8.2%) is between 
these two values. It should be pointed out that all three are lower than the initial CAR estimate 
without any leverage correction (-9.7%), and they all still remain non-significant. Annex 1 
shows the two series of CARs resulting from the hypothesis of no conversion and from an 
immediate total conversion in stocks. 
 
The necessity of taking into account an adjustment in the market model to obtain the normal 
return is rarely mentioned in the current literature, which generally focuses on a very short 
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period around the issue date. However, taking into account the mechanical effect of a change 
in leverage, as well as a longer investigative period, leads us to results that contrast with those 
usually presented in the literature, and revealing significant negative abnormal short-term 
returns after CB issues. 
 
Our findings notably contradict the recent study by Ducassy (2003) for CBs on the French 
market. That study showed an abnormal negative return of 5% in the window [d-10, d+10] for 
issues announcing an investment goal. Ducassy concluded with the absence of abnormal 
return for CB issues designed for for ‘financial restructuring’. Therefore, it seems that the 
financial communication from the issuing firm may explain the reaction to an announcement 
of a CB issue. According to Ducassy, the effect of the announcement is negative in the case of 
future investments. If the goal is to avoid loss of value for existing shareholders, the issuing 
firm tends to announce a goal of financial restructuring. Conversely, if the firm wishes to 
lower its market price for reasons unrelated to the existence of a dominant shareholder (for 
example, to buy shares on the market at a lower cost and to reinforce its own control), it will 
advertise its motivation as investment. 
 
In the event of a clear communication by the issuing firm of its intentions, the results of 
Ducassy and other authors (including Burlacu (2000), Hachette (1991, 1994) and Bah (1997), 
for the French market reaction) could very well be reversed. After correcting for the simple 
effect of leverage for firms that declare an investment motive, temporary abnormal returns 
can become non-significant, like those we obtained for the window [d-8, d-6]. Similarly, if we 
consider the scenario in which firms use CBs to improve their financial structure and 
effectively do so, it is necessary to make a double correction of the beta, because the CB first 
raises the net equity and then serves to reduce debt. In this case (always supposing that the 
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announcement reflects the firm’s real policy), it is possible in the end that null abnormal 
returns become positive abnormal returns. 
 
Of course, it is very difficult to believe the published intentions of the issuing firm. 
Nevertheless, the study by Ducassy (2003) reveals that one-third of the studied firms (22 of 
60) intended to carry out a financial restructuring. In their study of a sample of European 
firms, Bancel and Mittoo (2004) mention such an intention in 23% of cases. The two 
objectives of financial restructuring and of undertaking investments are not mutually 
exclusive. Both can be pursued jointly. Under these conditions, it would seem preferable, in 
our analysis of CB issues, not to take into consideration the objectives published by the 
issuing firm, as we are aware that the communication policy of these firms may pollute their 
announced intent. This prudence highlights the necessity of judging the effects of abnormal 
returns over a period longer than 10 or 20 days after the announcement of the issue. In effect, 
during the six months following the event date, the market can progressively observe the true 
behaviour of the issuing firms: a policy of financial restructuring or of developing 
investments. The effective ex post decisions are then integrated into the market values. The 
large variations in forecast behaviours or strategies can explain the non-significant results 
before or at the time of issue. 
 
After correcting for the debt leverage effect, we observe that after four months (d+88), 
abnormal cumulative negative returns are -3%. The average cumulative negative return of -
8% only appears at the end of the overall period (i.e. six months). The sign test confirms the 
non-significance of these abnormal cumulative returns up to d+122. In fact, the -8% figure 
makes it scarcely convincing that this average should cover many different situations of 
positive and negative individual CARs. From here forward, we take into account the debt 
correction of beta coefficients when estimating the normal returns. 
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- Correction for the dilution effect 
Another correction could be made to ‘neutralize’ any possible dilution effect and to explore 
the abnormal returns in a more optimistic approach. In fact, a drop in the stock market price 
several days before the issue can result from investor sensitivity to the fear of dilution of the 
overall share value. Nothing leads us to confirm whether the dilution is certain. If, as in the 
announcement, we integrate a pure dilution effect into the market value of the shares, we 
make a completely pessimistic hypothesis of the use of raised funds, that is, that they will 
reimburse payable debts and have a null effect on the economic profitability of the firm. 
Given a CB issue that has the only consequence of no change in the firm’s equity value and 
immediate diluting, the existing shareholders see their investment value drop by an average of 
1.8% in the sample. In the event that investors’ pessimism is justified, the market value 
following an issue fully integrates the dilution effect. Thus, we assume that at the issue date, 
the market value covers (among other things) a drop of 1.8% resulting from a pure dilution 
effect. An optimistic investor who considers the contrary hypothesis (i.e., that no dilution 
effect exists) may reconstruct the market value by cancelling the hypothetically integrated 
dilution effect. To reconstruct the market value without a supposed total dilution effect and 
use it as upper bound, it is necessary only to raise the market value by about 1.8% by 
multiplying it on the day of issue. We used this correction when considering a specific 
dilution correction coefficient for each individual issue. The dilution coefficient is calculated 
from the total number of outstanding, shares divided by the total number of new shares 
resulting from conversion of the amount issued and outstanding shares. We added the 
convertible issued amount to the equity at the issue date. Total equity inflates from the issued 
amount (including the conversion premium). In this pessimistic view the raised funds are 
immediately assimilated to equity capital and used to reimburse debts.   
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Figure 2 re-examines the abnormal profits now doubly corrected (accounting for debt 
leverage and ‘pessimistic’ dilution). The cumulative abnormal return is positive from d+0 to 
d+51 for the investors who estimate the dilution effect to be null. The abnormal positive 
return when dilution is absent is +0.7% on the day of the announcement, compared with a 
drop of -1.8% if no correction is made. It increases to reach +1% and shows an opposite 
positive sign compared to other abnormal return studies without correction. The CAR stays in 
the -1/-2% range until d+110 and then decreases to finish at a cumulative return over six 
months at an average -6.7%. At no time is the cumulative return significantly negative (see 
Annex 1). The non-parametric sign test also confirms this result. Table 3 summarizes the 
cumulative average abnormal returns at d+122 for different sizes of the L1 window and when 
referring to the constant mean model to estimate the normal returns. In every case, the results 
converge. They confirm that a market model used without correcting the beta could lead to 
significant and negative abnormal returns. However, taking into account modified levered 
betas for CBs shows non-significant CARs (except for the shorter estimation period and only 
6 months after the issue date, see Table 3)23. The results are robust relative to the choice of the 
pre-event estimation period used to estimate the beta coefficients. Both longer and shorter 
windows give similar results in a double correction framework and confirm the importance of 
correcting beta in the abnormal return test (see Table 3). 
 
INSERT Figure 2 
 
INSERT Table 3 
 
                                                 
23
 The reference to an alternative constant mean return model also leads to similar results; the cumulative average abnormal 
return at d+122 moves from -14% to -10% and turns from a significant value at the 1% level to a weaker 10% level when 
correcting the betas for leverage.  
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It must be noted that a scenario of total dilution effect is based on the pessimistic assumption 
of an unchanged firm’s current profit and increased net equity capital. In this extreme case, 
the dilution effect corresponds to a strategy of ‘debt reimbursement and strengthening of the 
financial structure’. We can suppose that the collected funds replace existing debt and 
diminishes its net cost and, thus, that they have effect on the profit due to shareholders. It also 
corresponds to a similar situation where all the operating profit linked to any new investment 
financed by the CB is just sufficient to cover the cost of the CB. In this situation, the issue of 
a CB is an unfavourable signal and should result in significantly negative cumulative average 
abnormal returns. Our results do not confirm this hypothesis of an overall negative long-term 
effect. 
 
A strategy of ‘profitable investment opportunities’ can also be mentioned when the reinvested 
funds produce perspectives of improved results and thereby support a rise in the share value. 
If the investments show profitability greater than the cost of the CB, their dilution effect on 
the firm’s profit and on market value varies according to the creation of value for all 
shareholders. It may even be cancelled. Similarly, looking at a strategy of ‘reinforcing the 
financial structure’, the operation, even with its mechanically dilutive effect, can create value 
for the shareholder because it reduces the cost of capital and/or places the firm at its optimum 
level of debt, if it is not already in that position. In such a case, the incidence in terms of net 
dilution effect may be null or reversed. A combination of these two financial strategies may 
also be possible. 
 
It is better to assume an uncertain future dilution effect between the two extreme cases of (i) a 
100% dilution effect without any value creation, and (ii) a null (positive) net dilution effect. 
This is due to the creation of balancing (greater) economic value compensating dilution. 
Under the latter optimistic hypothesis, the creation of value would be positive, thus 
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compensating for the dilution effect. Therefore, the average market reaction would cover a 
wide variety of situations specific to each firm’s strategy (see the grey area in Figure 2). In a 
possible mixed scenario, the market equity value of the firm inflates by the amount of the CB 
issue, assuming a reinvestment of the proceeds at the firm’s cost of capital and no debt 
reimbursement. Then, a positive effect will limit dilution. In our sample, the average amount 
of equity market value will increase by 9.20% if conversion is immediate. It compares with a 
total immediate and apparent dilution effect of -9.97%. Any mixed scenario stands between 
the polar limits of pure dilution correction and no dilution correction seen in Figure 2. In 
summary, it is unsurprising that, in such a context, the sign of cumulative average abnormal 
returns becomes non-significant. 
 
2.2.3 Analysis of CAR explaining variables 
It is of interest to determine which variables explain the size of cumulative negative returns in 
EB and CB samples over the L2 period [d-17, d+122]. We performed a cross-sectional 
regression to test if firms’ characteristics explain the direction or the magnitude of the 
abnormal market returns. The CAR of each EB was regressed against the rate of diffusion of 
capital involved by the EB issue, the conversion premium at the time of issue (in %), the 
amount of the issue, the accounting debt leverage and the maturity of the EB at its issue. We 
added two other variables to take into account the firm’s investment policy. The first one is 
the market-to-book ratio, which represents the ratio of the market value to the book value of 
equity. It corresponds to the existence of potential profitable investment projects. We also 
considered the variation of the beta coefficient, which compares the beta values of the market 
as estimated before and after the issue, with the beta after the issue calculated during the 
second six-month window, L2. In the latter case, to avoid a possible endogeneity problem, we 
do not use the series of CARs as a dependent variable. The initial β0 coefficient appears in 
both sides of the regression equation. As a dependent variable we used the CARs calculated 
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as the simple excess stock return minus the market index return (i.e., assuming beta is equal to 
1). Therefore the dependent variable is free from any beta estimates. Individual OLS 
regressions were used because of possible collinearity between some variables; for example, 
diffusion ratios and issued amounts are correlated (the same is true for dilution ratios). Table 
4 shows the results obtained for the EBs. No variable appears to explain the individual 
abnormal negative returns. 
 
INSERT Table 4 
 
The same simple linear regressions were carried out for the CB sample. We chose the dilution 
ratio of initial equity due to the CB issue as first explanatory variable (cf. Table 5). The other 
independent variables were the same as those used to analyse the CARs of EBs. None of the 
variables corresponding to the characteristics of the issue or of the firm had any significant 
effect on the size of the abnormal returns. Only the beta variation was shown to play an 
explanatory role (significant with a p-probability of 0.073) in the individual abnormal 
negative returns. An increase in the beta between the periods before and after the issue 
corresponds to an abnormal negative return. All things being equal, after the issue, an increase 
of 10% in the beta caused an abnormal negative return of 2.6% for the stock. That confirms 
the intuition that a higher forecasted risk elicits a relative drop in the stock value. 
 
INSERT Table 5 
 
The previous result illustrates that the ultimate determining factors of excessive or insufficient 
performance must be analysed in the context of the financial policy linked to the CB issue: 
profitable investment perspectives or a strategy of financial restructuring. We are led to a 
case-by-case analysis in a situation of information asymmetry because investors in the market 
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do not have access to private economic information, nor do they know the true intentions of 
the issuer. Investors in the market know only the current beta at the moment of issue. The 
future behaviour of the firm is directed by decisions that cause a decline in beta (decrease in 
debt leverage, financial restructuring, investment of received amounts in projects with low 
economic risk), or conversely an increase in beta (high risk investments, increase in debt 
following a CB issue). 
 
These decisions can be cumulative. In a market characterized by a high degree of information 
efficiency, investors will, during the six months following a CB issue, appreciate or sanction 
the firm’s new decisions. A significant variation in the beta would prove this. Consequently, it 
is useful to see if significant differences in beta exist between the two six-month sub-periods. 
Under the null hypothesis of beta stability, the betas must on average remain constant. The 
average estimated beta drops from 0.89 to 0.80 in the six months following a CB issue for the 
43 firms in the sample. In 33 of the 43 cases, they do not differ significantly during the 
period. In four cases, they are significantly higher and, in six cases, significantly lower. Thus, 
a small number of firms proceed toward strategic changes that lead to an increased risk for 
them. Others lower their risk, for example, by reducing their debt. Thus, we observe a 
strategic ex post financial dimension that was not apparent at the initial announcement date. 
This fact largely explains the cumulative negative returns, which can thus be redefined as 
normal and no longer abnormal. A firm need only reduce its debt and its risk after the issue 
for the former beta to lead to expected returns that are too high and to incorrectly produce 
negative excess returns. This explanation is consistent with the significant relationship 
between abnormal returns and beta variations, as previously highlighted. On average, the 
change in beta corresponds to the application of the average adjustment coefficient linked to 
the decline in debt leverage previously estimated at 0.91 (and based on the assimilation of the 
CB issues into new equity). By applying this to the average beta before issue, we find an 
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average provisional beta of 0.81 (0.89 multiplied by 0.91). The average provisional beta is 
effectively the one observed six months after the CB issue in the market (0.80)24. 
 
It is therefore a rational conclusion for investors to expect, on average, a new corrected beta 
value equal to the initial beta, but modified by the variation of the leverage effect. Thus, 
investors are generally justified in nullifying the voluntary choices of investment policy and 
debt strategies, which can result in either an increase or a decrease in the beta. On average, the 
two possibilities seem equal. The choices are thus made according to the real surplus returns, 
which are abnormal if we apply the former betas, but which are fully justified by the firm’s 
ultimate decisions. These positive and negative surplus returns, linked to beta correction, 
make the abnormal returns estimated from previous data null, if analyse any CB issue ex ante. 
 
2.2.4. Consequences for portfolio management 
In the case of a CB issue, the previous developments can explain the better performance of a 
CB investment as opposed than that of underlying stocks. At the time of issue, the higher cost 
of convertibles is due to a stock price increased by conversion premiums. However, 
underlying stocks are generally affected during the CB life by a return that is mechanically 
lowered to its new equilibrium, which integrates an average financial restructuring behaviour. 
In addition, compared to stocks, CBs have the advantage of an interest coupon. 
 
INSERT Table 6 
 
Table 6 shows the average annual returns of the Exane 25 index of the most significant 
European CBs with a clear hybrid character (delta around 50%) over a 12-year period. It also 
                                                 
24
 A case-by-case study of the economic and financial choices of the firm following the CB issue could have been carried out 
in order to explore which type of investments (diversification, risky projects, etc.) and which liability restructuring decisions 
(increase or decrease in leverage) have effectively been made. The case-by-case analysis may be more relevant than relying 
on estimated betas, particularly if it were possible to conduct an analysis over a period longer than six months. Often more 
than six months is needed after the issues to detect the effective intentions and strategic choices of the firms. 
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shows the Sharpe ratio for this type of hybrid CB25, which has an average of 0.065. The return 
of the basket of underlying shares is concurrently calculated. To be strictly comparable to CB 
performance, we must add the stock dividends in order to be consistent with CBs which pay 
interest coupons. The average Sharpe ratio for the basket of underlying stocks then becomes 
0.018. The comparison of performance by the Exane index between the underlying CB stocks 
and the CAC 40 market index yields similar results. The findings are normal because the most 
significant CB issues are carried out by large firms, which belong to the CAC 40 index26. In 
the light of our results, the superiority of CBs as a class of assets in comparison to stocks can 
be explained by the inconvenience of holding the stocks of firms that, having issued a CB, are 
exposed to an additional hazard related to the use of the received funds. In fact, during a CB 
issue, the investors in underlying shares are in a situation of information asymmetry with 
regard to the issuing firm’s financial communication policies and future strategies. This risk 
leads average investors to protect themselves by discounting a mechanical decline in the debt 
leverage. However, this rational ex ante attitude is subject to the uncertainty of the issuing 
firm’s financial or economic strategies. The global over-performance of a CB portfolio can 
find part of its explanation in these specific risks as compared to a simple stock issue, where 
the choice is clear in terms of financial structure. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In recent years, the reaction of the prices of underlying stocks in a CB issue on major 
international stock markets has been regularly tested. The majority of empirical work, except 
for studies carried out in Japan and the Netherlands, indicates a negative market reaction, 
mostly measuring abnormal returns within a very short window around the announcement 
                                                 
25
 The CBs have an asymmetric return because of the presence of a purchase option, which makes it rather difficult to use the 
Sharpe ratio. However, in this case the Exane index is based on convertible bonds, which are renewed, and remains on 
average ‘at the money’. Thus the Sharpe ratio here constitutes an acceptable approximation. 
26
 It seems there is no long period ‘sector’ effect of CB issues compared to the rest of the market since the average daily 
return and standard deviation are very close in the two indexes. 
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date of a CB issue in. In the light of these results, our contribution is to investigate the 
consequences of issuing convertible or exchangeable bonds on the French stock market. More 
precisely, our aim is to review the market reaction to the issue by employing different 
corrections and by selecting a window of analysis over a longer term of seven months before 
and six months after the issue date. We introduced two corrections on the debt leverage ratio 
and on the importance of the dilution effect. We defined not a strict estimate of abnormal 
returns, but a band inside which the abnormal returns may lie. The corrections will soften the 
global negative abnormal returns documented by a simple traditional event study 
methodology and introduce higher bounds on CARs. This correction in the variation of the 
debt leverage ratio following a CB issue appeared significant and robust to the results 
empirically obtained on French CBs. Such an effect can explain the negative signs often 
observed in previous studies, a point that has not often been raised in the existing literature, 
except, in a different context, by Janjigian (1987) or Kleidt and Schiereck (2006). Our study 
shows cumulative abnormal returns that are, on average, negative for EBs and non-significant 
following CB issues. This absence of global incidence is indicative of considerable 
differences in individual behaviour by issuers of CBs. We need to take into account their 
effective intentions and strategic choices when analysing CB issues. The two goals, described 
as ‘investment financing’ or ‘financial restructuring’, are not mutually exclusive; both may 
both exist when issuing. They may both be used by the issuers as elements of their financial 
communication. However, if they exist, the two goals only gradually become perceptible as 
the firm evolves. 
 
These motivations are not revealed in the short windows of observation that highlight 
abnormal returns resulting from a CB or EB issue. The analysis of the dilution effect and that 
of the different explanatory variables of cumulative average abnormal returns does not enable 
us to identify a clear common determining factor for the firms in the sample. However, there 
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is value in studying the post-issue financial behaviours of the firms as identified through the 
variation in betas calculated before and after the issue. This method, rarely used in the 
available literature, also enables us to confirm the large divergence of effective behaviours, 
which is perfectly consistent with abnormal returns that are generally non-significant. 
 
Our empirical results were then put into perspective within the context of portfolio 
management by analysing CB performance as a class of assets compared to other classes 
of related assets, such as stocks and bonds. The EB issuing firms appear to benefit from a 
transfer of value because their participation is sold at a price clearly above the market 
value. The gain in value should then benefit the shareholders of the issuing firm. The 
positive effects counterbalancing dilution and resulting from the investment/financing 
decisions inherent in a CB issue take place in a context of asymmetric information for the 
outside shareholders. We show that the investor should not harbour an a priori fear of the 
dilution effect during a CB issue. A CB issue, on its own, creates future value for the 
shareholders if it enables the firm to make other profitable investments. It can also 
constitute a positive signal regarding the restructuring of the firm’s financial liabilities and 
the optimisation of its debt structure. Outside shareholders facing a CB issue cannot say 
with any degree of certainty whether a future dilution will occur. The size of the dilution is 
determined by an unknown investment/financing policy of the firm; a CB issue is just one 
element. The unanticipated changes in risk class following a CB issue appear to 
correspond effectively with ex post abnormal returns. In the light of the work of 
Carayannopoulos (1996) and Ammann et al. (2003), one intuitive explanation for our 
results regarding a possible underpricing of CBs might be that standard CB pricing models 
might not pay enough attention to the additional specific risk outlined in our analysis. In 
fact, we can hypothesise that CB issues bear a specific risk compared to standard debt or 
equity issues. In these two situations, the leverage ratios are immediately affected and 
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outside investors are (classically) exposed to asymmetric information regarding the use of 
the raised funds. For CBs, the changes in leverage ratios are uncertain and depend on the 
conversion’s completion and speed. CBs involve a specific risk related to the future 
financial leverage of the firm, which cumulates with the dilution risk. Ceteris paribus, this 
makes CB issues more risky and might explain the apparent overperformance, and the 
possible underpricing, of this class of asset compared to stocks. 
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Table 1 
Empirical studies on convertible bond issue announcements 
Country Author(s) Market reaction to 
announcement 
US Dann and Mikkelson (1984) 
Eckbo (1986) 
Smith (1986) 
Hansen and Crutchley (1990) 
Kim and Stulz (1992) 
Lee and Loughran (1998)  
-2.31% 
-1.90% 
-2.07% 
-1.45% 
-1.66% and -1.07% 
-1.30% 
Japan Kang, Kim, Park and Stulz 
(1995) 
Kang and Stulz (1996) 
Christensen, Faria, Kwok and 
Bremer (1996) 
Mollemans (2002) 
0.50% 
 
0.83% 
0.18% 
 
-4.50% 
Germany Ammann, Fehr and Seiz (2006) -1.56% 
Switzerland Ammann, Fehr and Seiz (2006) -0.89% 
Netherlands De Roon and Veld (1998)27 0.23% 
UK Abhyankar and Dunning (1999) -1.21% 
France28 Bah (1997) 
Hachette (1991, 1994) 
Burlacu (2000) 
Ducassy (2003) 
-0.44% 
-0.56% 
-0.23% 
-0.88% 
                                                 
27
 The authors also summarize the available literature on the effects of a CB announcement and the incidence of the 
‘conversion to shares’ component in the observed reactions. 
28
 For a synthesis of empirical studies of the French market reaction to a CB issue, see Hachette (1991), Hamon and 
Jacquillat (1992), Ginglinger (2000) and Gajewski and Ginglinger (2002). Ginglinger (2000) proposes, in addition, a 
synthesis of studies related to the long-term performance of CB issuers, and emphasises the difficulty of interpreting the 
results, which are generally unfavourable. According to Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2000), one of the explanatory factors 
would be the ‘timing’ of the issue, which is often launched after a sharp rise in the share price. 
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Table 2  
 
Characteristics of the sample 
 
M: million; Maturity: at the issue date in years, Long-term debt: estimated long- and medium-
term book value debt; Book leverage: debt leverage ratio using the accounting value of 
equity; Market leverage: debt leverage ratio using the market value of equity; New shares: 
number of potentially created shares; Outsd. shares: number of existing shares; Diffusion: 
percentage of equity capital of the target firm converted in EB issues, Dilution: ratio of the 
number of new shares following the CB conversion divided by the total number of new and 
outstanding shares, Corr. book beta: beta coefficient corrected on the basis of the book value 
leverage; Corr. market beta: beta coefficient corrected by the market value leverage. 
 
 Average Minimum Maximum Standard 
deviation 
N 
Maturity  6.07 2.50 16.88 2.96 59 
Coupon (%) 2.20 0.00 7.92 1.42 59 
Amount (M€) 738.98 121.51 3492.00 630.14 59 
Long-term debt 6748.66 5.38 35767.00 7551.26 35 
Book leverage 1.57 0.02 15.67 2.61 34 
Market leverage 0.82 0.01 6.42 1.28 24 
New equity book value (M€) 7504.52 204.14 38685.00 7383.86 49 
New equity mkt. value(M€) 11355.43 978.05 57832.38 13002.39 39 
New book leverage 1.08 0.01 6.34 1.12 34 
New market leverage 0.72 0.01 5.20 1.04 24 
Var. book leverage -0.49 -9.33 -0.01 1.59 34 
Var. market leverage -0.10 -1.22 0.00 0.24 24 
New shares (M) 16.24 1.44 120.79 19.94 59 
Outsd. shares (M) 359.04 5.20 1452.66 442.53 56 
Diffusion ratio (EBs) 0.05 0.00 0.09 0.03 16 
Dilution ratio (CBs) 0.91 0.54 0.99 0.08 40 
Conv. premium (%) 25.00 -20.50 102.25 18.52 59 
Corr. book beta  0.90 0.44 0.99 0.12 34 
Corr. market beta  0.96 0.84 1.00 0.03 24 
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Table 3  
 
CARs tests according to different lengths of estimation period L1 
 
CAR at d+122: cumulative abnormal return 122 business days after the issue, in decimal; 
leverage correction: average correction for debt leverage; dilution corrections: abnormal 
returns doubly corrected with new debt leverage and a supposed total immediate dilution; *: 
10% confidence level, **: 5% confidence level, ***: 1% confidence level; First significant 
day: first day of the event period L2 evidencing a non-zero cumulative average abnormal 
return at 95% level; for the four samples, N is respectively 15, 42, 34 and 34. 
 
 EB sample CB sample 
(without 
correction) 
CB sample 
(with leverage 
correction) 
CB sample 
(with dilution 
corrections) 
Market model     
L1 [d-90,d-18]     
CAR at d+122 -0.177 -0.125 -0.139 -0.124 
t-test -2.65*** -2.60*** -2.78*** -2.49** 
First significant 
day 
d+87 d+97 d+111 d+112 
L1 [d-163,d-18]     
CAR at d+122 -0.171 -0.097 -0.082 -0.067 
t-test -2.87*** -1.99** -1.56 -1.28 
First significant 
day 
d+68 d+119 none none 
L1 [d-236,d-18]     
CAR at d+122 -0.134 -0.105 -0.079 -0.066 
t-test -2.02** -2.18** -1.52 -1.27 
First significant 
day 
d+122 d+116 none none 
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Table 4  
 
Analysis of determinants of the CARs of EBs 
 
Diffusion ratio: fraction of capital of the target firm to be exchangeable; Premium: conversion 
premium at issue in percentage; Amount issued: size of the issue in millions of euros; Book 
leverage: book value of the debt to equity ratio; Maturity: at the issue date in years; MtB: 
Market to book ratio; β0-β1: variation of the market model estimation of beta before and after 
the issue with betas estimated on the L1 and the L2 windows, respectively; dependent 
variable is CARs estimated using a market model with a single debt leverage correction 
except for β0-β1, where the dependent variable is the CAR estimated using a simple mean 
market model; b: estimated regression coefficient; a: estimated constant, standard deviation is 
shown in parentheses; F: F-Fisher; number of observations is 16. 
 
Independent variable b a F p-val 
Diffusion ratio -0.674 -0.141 0.078 0.926 
(2.417) (0.124)   
    
Premium (%) -0.004 -0.080 1.589 0.239 
(0.003) (0.092)   
    
Amount issued  -0.514 -0.070 0.505 0.615 
(0.723) (0.113)   
    
Book leverage ratio -0.001 -0.138 0.003 0.997 
(0.012) (0.073)   
    
Maturity 0.041 -0.383 1.125 0.352 
(0.039) (0.207)   
    
MtB -0.034 -0.014 0.450 0.655 
(0.051) (0.175)   
    
β0-β1 
with CAR mean 
(-0.028) (0.057) 0.024 0.977 
0.184 0.056   
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Table 5  
 
Analysis of determinants of the CARs of CBs 
 
For definitions of the variables: see Table 4; dilution ratio: fraction of capital of the target 
firm to be converted compared to outstanding equity; number of observations is 34. 
  
Independent variable B a F p-val 
Dilution ratio 0.173 -0.241 0.062 0.941 
(0.693) (0.638)   
    
Premium (%) -0.004 0.017 2.185 0.130 
(0.003) (0.085)   
    
Amount issued 0.046 -0.100 0.297 0.744 
(0.084) (0.062)   
    
Book leverage ratio -0.026 -0.041 1.648 0.208 
(0.020) (0.061)   
    
Maturity -0.004 -0.054 0.084 0.919 
(0.015) (0.112)   
    
MtB 0.008 -0.092 0.875 0.431 
(0.009) (0.076)   
    
β0-β1 
with CAR mean 
-0.265 -0.026 2.843 0.073 
(0.157) (0.041)   
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Table 6  
 
Average return, standard deviation and return-risk ratio of convertible bonds, underlying shares and CAC 40 index 
 
Av. Return: average return in decimal, Std. dev: annual standard deviation, Ratio: average return divided by standard deviation using daily data; 
period: 1991-2003; source: Exane. 
 
 
 
Exane convertibles index Underlying stocks index (incl. dividends) Underlying stocks index (excl. dividends) French CAC 40 index 
 Av. return Std. dev Ratio Av. return Std. dev Ratio Av. return Std. dev Ratio Av. return Std. dev Ratio 
1991-2003 
 average 
0.00038 0.00576 0.06557 0.00025 0.01380 0.01804 0.00021 0.01318 0.01594 0.00026 0.01406 0.01836 
2003 0.00036 0.00158 0.22451 0.00081 0.01580 0.05101 0.00076 0.01578 0.04790 0.00059 0.01609 0.03644 
2002 -0.00001 0.00449 -0.00268 -0.00169 0.02034 -0.08320 -0.00173 0.02034 -0.08511 -0.00161 0.02238 -0.07199 
2001 -0.00035 0.00586 -0.05923 -0.00121 0.01614 -0.07470 -0.00124 0.01839 -0.06739 -0.00106 0.01675 -0.06299 
2000 -0.00011 0.01148 -0.00989 -0.00036 0.01610 -0.02216 -0.00038 0.01498 -0.02535 0.00006 0.01465 0.00385 
1999 0.00061 0.00635 0.09555 0.00129 0.01114 0.11558 0.00126 0.01091 0.11547 0.00160 0.01207 0.13233 
1998 0.00117 0.00911 0.12801 0.00165 0.01513 0.10883 0.00158 0.01367 0.11560 0.00108 0.01660 0.06517 
1997 0.00061 0.00520 0.11647 0.00147 0.01218 0.12061 0.00143 0.01194 0.11974 0.00100 0.01396 0.07148 
1996 0.00056 0.00252 0.22171 0.00045 0.01552 0.02871 0.00040 0.00690 0.05859 0.00084 0.00788 0.10670 
1995 0.00057 0.00323 0.17639 0.00027 0.00983 0.02753 0.00024 0.00983 0.02442 0.00000 0.01104 -0.00041 
1994 -0.00039 0.00453 -0.08519 -0.00102 0.01145 -0.08915 -0.00095 0.01074 -0.08876 -0.00077 0.01106 -0.06948 
1993 0.00103 0.00367 0.28192 0.00103 0.00882 0.11681 0.00090 0.00898 0.09988 0.00082 0.00977 0.08356 
1992 0.00041 0.00424 0.09634 0.00005 0.01056 0.00437 0.00000 0.01067 0.00039 0.00026 0.01209 0.02149 
1991 0.00045 0.00485 0.09230 0.00045 0.01140 0.03986 0.00041 0.01136 0.03591 0.00050 0.01234 0.04069 
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Annex 1  
Cumulative average abnormal returns for EBs and CBs samples 
 CARs: Cumulative average abnormal returns from d-17 to the final day; d is the issue date; results are presented with a 5-day step; Market model estimation window L1 d-
163, d-18; Number of underlying shares in the sample: 16 EB issues, 42 CB issues in the without correction case, 34 for CB issues in the other cases; leverage correction: 
average correction for debt leverage; no conversion hyp: hypothesis of no conversion, debt leverage is calculated assuming CB remains debt; total conversion hyp: hypothesis 
of total immediate conversion; dilution correction: abnormal returns corrected with new debt leverage and a supposed total dilution at maturity date; t-test CAR: relation (5) 
statistic from d-17 to the final day; *, **, and ***: significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 EBs CBs (without correction) CBs (leverage correction) CBs (no conversion hyp) CBs (total conversion hyp) CBs (dilution correction) 
Day CAR t-test CAR t-test CAR t-test CAR t-test CAR t-test CAR t-test 
-15 -0.0109 -1.2467 0.0079 1.1191 0.0074 0.9657 0.0068 0.8895 0.0075 0.9712 0.0074 0.9657 
-10 -0.0003 -0.0206 0.0126 1.0927 0.0176 1.3994 0.0143 1.1376 0.0178 1.4143 0.0176 1.3994 
-5 -0.0187 -1.0265 -0.0171 -1.1689 -0.0091 -0.5715 -0.0105 -0.6587 -0.0090 -0.5623 -0.0091 -0.5715 
0 -0.0111 -0.5201 -0.0180 -1.0454 -0.0079 -0.4214 -0.0061 -0.3228 -0.0080 -0.4227 0.0070 0.3733 
5 -0.0082 -0.3374 -0.0083 -0.4242 -0.0009 -0.0436 0.0000 -0.0018 -0.0009 -0.0417 0.0140 0.6594 
10 0.0111 0.4169 -0.0145 -0.6727 -0.0038 -0.1637 -0.0033 -0.1420 -0.0038 -0.1622 0.0111 0.4734 
15 0.0026 0.0912 -0.0128 -0.5503 0.0028 0.1087 0.0024 0.0928 0.0028 0.1092 0.0177 0.6956 
20 -0.0159 -0.5123 -0.0184 -0.7346 -0.0012 -0.0449 -0.0001 -0.0051 -0.0012 -0.0444 0.0137 0.5020 
25 -0.0341 -1.0316 -0.0178 -0.6663 -0.0010 -0.0360 0.0006 0.0215 -0.0012 -0.0409 0.0139 0.4781 
30 -0.0332 -0.9504 -0.0205 -0.7287 -0.0022 -0.0719 -0.0026 -0.0842 -0.0024 -0.0785 0.0127 0.4147 
35 -0.0400 -1.0878 -0.0207 -0.6990 -0.0006 -0.0183 0.0004 0.0126 -0.0007 -0.0231 0.0144 0.4447 
40 -0.0583 -1.5170 -0.0142 -0.4586 0.0063 0.1872 0.0121 0.3575 0.0060 0.1780 0.0213 0.6928 
45 -0.0715 -1.7862* -0.0159 -0.4940 0.0011 0.0308 0.0099 0.2823 0.0006 0.0174 0.0160 0.4555 
50 -0.0612 -1.4722 -0.0240 -0.7160 -0.0078 -0.2127 -0.0002 -0.0046 -0.0082 -0.2230 0.0072 0.1961 
55 -0.0635 -1.4723 -0.0315 -0.9075 -0.0224 -0.5900 -0.0043 -0.1144 -0.0231 -0.6096 -0.0074 -0.1954 
60 -0.0810 -1.8175* -0.0359 -1.0001 -0.0287 -0.7329 -0.0106 -0.2693 -0.0295 -0.7514 -0.0137 -0.3512 
65 -0.0831 -1.8086* -0.0251 -0.6793 -0.0182 -0.4506 -0.0064 -0.1577 -0.0188 -0.4641 -0.0032 -0.0805 
70 -0.0952 -2.0126** -0.0361 -0.9481 -0.0272 -0.6533 -0.0156 -0.3744 -0.0278 -0.6669 -0.0122 -0.2939 
75 -0.0983 -2.0209** -0.0452 -1.1530 -0.0336 -0.7845 -0.0214 -0.4988 -0.0342 -0.7993 -0.0186 -0.4346 
80 -0.1085 -2.1735** -0.0554 -1.3784 -0.0273 -0.6201 -0.0167 -0.3810 -0.0277 -0.6313 -0.0123 -0.2795 
85 -0.1136 -2.2198** -0.0688 -1.6674 -0.0416 -0.9235 -0.0225 -0.4994 -0.0424 -0.9413 -0.0266 -0.5913 
90 -0.1346 -2.5668** -0.0577 -1.3664 -0.0316 -0.6847 -0.0119 -0.2579 -0.0325 -0.7055 -0.0166 -0.3603 
95 -0.1368 -2.5507** -0.0642 -1.4868 -0.0316 -0.6688 -0.0070 -0.1482 -0.0327 -0.6919 -0.0166 -0.3517 
100 -0.1484 -2.7086*** -0.0661 -1.4983 -0.0362 -0.7505 -0.0102 -0.2123 -0.0374 -0.7756 -0.0212 -0.4401 
105 -0.1379 -2.4647** -0.0708 -1.5709 -0.0394 -0.8000 -0.0110 -0.2231 -0.0405 -0.8231 -0.0244 -0;4960 
110 -0.1546 -2.7083*** -0.0680 -1.4792 -0.0381 -0.7583 -0.0062 -0.1228 -0.0395 -0.7866 -0.0231 -0.4602 
115 -0.1663 -2.8579*** -0.0849 -1.8125* -0.0658 -1.2851 -0.0283 -0.5537 -0.0674 -1.3161 -0.0508 -0.9927 
120 -0.1767 -2.9824*** -0.0996 -2.0559** -0.0830 -1.5918 -0.0484 -0.9288 -0.0844 -1.6191 -0.0680 -1.3048 
122 -0.1714 -2.8718*** -0.0971 -1.9884** -0.0820 -1.5613 -0.0442 -0.8413 -0.0836 -1.5920 -0.0672 -1.2710 
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Annex 2  
 
Sign test on cumulative average abnormal returns 
 
Sign test statistic from d-17 to the final day; d is the issue date; results are presented with a 5-
day step; leverage correction: average correction for debt leverage; dilution corrections: 
abnormal returns corrected with new debt leverage and a supposed total dilution at maturity 
date; Sign test statistic calculated from equation (6) follows a normal distribution; *, **, and 
***: significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Day EB sample CBs 
(without correction) 
CBs 
(leverage correction) 
CBs 
(dilution corrections) 
-15 -1.500 1.677** 1.715** 1.715** 
-10 0.500 1.067 1.029 1.029 
-5 -1.000 -1.982*** -1.715** -1.715** 
0 -1.000 -1.677** -0.686 0.686 
5 -0.500 -1.372 -1.029 -0.343 
10 0.500 -1.677** -0.686 0 
15 0.000 -1.677** -0.343 0 
20 -0.500 -0.762 -0.343 0.343 
25 -1.000 -1.372 -1.029 0.343 
30 -1.000 -0.457 -0.343 0.343 
35 -1.000 -0.762 -0.343 0 
40 -1.500 -1.372 -1.029 0 
45 -3.000*** -1.067 -0.343 -0.343 
50 -2.000** -0.762 -0.686 0.343 
55 -2.500** -0.762 -0.343 -0.343 
60 -3.000*** -0.762 -0.343 0 
65 -2.000** -0.457 -0.343 0.343 
70 -3.000*** -0.762 -0.343 0.343 
75 -2.500** -0.457 -0.343 0 
80 -2.500** -0.762 -0.343 0 
85 -2.500** -0.762 0.000 -0.343 
90 -3.000*** -0.762 0.000 -0.343 
95 -3.000*** -1.067 -0.343 -0.686 
100 -2.500** -0.152 -0.343 0 
105 -2.500** -0.457 0.000 -0.343 
110 -2.500** -1.372 -0.686 -0.343 
115 -2.500** -1.067 -1.372 -0.343 
120 -2.500** -1.543 -1.372 -0.685 
122 -2.933*** -1.234 -1.029 -0.343 
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Figure 1 
CARs of CBs and EBs samples. 
 
EBs: exchangeable issues, solid black line; CBs: discontinued black line; vertical axis: CARs: 
cumulative abnormal returns in decimal; horizontal axis: L2 window from d-17 to d+122; d: 
public announcement date of the issue. 
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Figure 2 
CARs of stocks for CBs and EBs samples with corrections 
 
EBs: exchangeable bonds, solid black line; CBs: not corrected convertible bonds abnormal 
returns, discontinued grey line; CBs one corr.: CBs with a correction corresponding to the 
debt leverage effect, thin black line; CBs double corr.: CBs with a double correction of 
returns for the debt leverage and an assumed total dilution offset, thin black line above the 
grey area; grey area: difference of cumulative returns due to the total dilution hypothesis; 
vertical axis: CARs : cumulative abnormal returns in decimal; horizontal axis: L2 window 
from d-17 to d+122; d: public announcement date of the issue 
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